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Tatiana Dias is a fellow at Tech Policy Press.

In an extraordinary win after the largest popular campaign in the country’s democratic history, Brazil re-elected President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT) to another term. Lula’s victory is not only a defeat for the far-right candidate, Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party (PL). It is also a defeat for United States President Donald Trump — who had in Bolsonaro a subservient ally — and for Big Tech companies faced by

 that they manipulated public debate and harmed Lula.

Now, anchored in a huge political victory, Brazil’s push to regulate Big Tech is set to reach a new level. 

 minutes after his re-election, Lula signaled that he will treat the regulation of large platforms as a priority. “This was an election in which we had to overcome outside interference coming in through digital platforms, which we are going to have to regulate,” he said. “We cannot have monstrous companies earning billions, paying no taxes, and trying to steer this country’s electoral outcome.”

Lula’s re-election was historic for several reasons. In the first round, Lula came in second, trailing by 1.87 percentage points. The outlook was bleak: a crushing defeat in the state governments and in Congress, 

 caucus ever. Never in Brazil’s history had a candidate who lost the first round gone on to win the second.

But the initial defeat became fuel. Immediately after the first round, a vast popular mobilization began, online and in the streets. Federal congressman André Janones, of the party Rede Sustentabilidade, led an online mobilization

 built around a WhatsApp group and “missions” that gamified the campaign and created the largest group in Brazil, with 10 million members. In the streets, pro-Lula demonstrations across the country broke attendance records — the largest, in São Paulo, 

explosion of complaints that the large platforms

 — particularly Meta, which controls WhatsApp and Instagram, Brazilians’ most popular communication channels — were interfering in the election. The organization I co-direct, CTRL+Z, collected more than 1,200 reports of censored profiles, removed content, and restricted pages, most of them from the left. 

 of a series of restrictions and failures that hurt his reach, according to Meta employees. The company 

 and claimed that “technical failures” resulted in the account restrictions that harmed Lula.

Whatever the reason for those failures, Meta’s influence on the Brazilian election inflamed the anger of pro-Lula Brazilians. The political fight also became a struggle for Brazil’s sovereignty against the power of Meta, Mark Zuckerberg and Donald Trump. On Monday, October 19, CTRL+Z joined with Código Não Binário, Sleeping Giants Brasil, Artigo 19, Diracom and others to 

 Big Tech in Brazil, outside Meta’s offices in São Paulo, drawing more than 1,000 people.

In this election, Big Tech became a symbol of US imperialism over Brazil, and became a mainstream concern. These elections delivered tech literacy to Brazilians on a massive scale, as they came to understand the consequences of faulty moderation systems, algorithmic discrimination, and digital sovereignty. The streets began to chant “Meta, don’t meddle,” “Meta, take your hands off our election,” and “Trump, Brazil will not be your backyard.”

The pressure went international. On October 21, nine independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council 

 Meta to examine whether its moderation, recommendation, and AI systems had disproportionately restricted one side of the presidential race, to explain any differences in treatment, and to guarantee that complaints could be contested and corrected before the vote rather than after.

The following day, 13 US lawmakers – Senator Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., and 12 House Democrats, led by Representative Pramila Jayapal, D-Was, also 

So far, Meta has not provided them, neither inside nor outside Brazil. The Superior Electoral Court barred Meta from discriminating between the candidates, 

As the complaints and the outrage piled up, however, Lula was busy gaining back ground. The left’s online strategies were coordinated through actions by “Lula’s Army,” which faced threats of 

 by the Superior Electoral Court but survived, and through a 

 producing campaign materials and tactics. In the streets, there were tireless in-person efforts, from mass demonstrations to small stalls set up to “flip votes.”

Polls showed Lula ticking upward over the course of the second round, but Bolsonaro remained ahead. Until election day arrive — a turbulent day, 

 and the need to extend voting hours. In the end, Lula 

 more than 10 million votes compared to the first round, in a spectacular comeback.

In his victory speech, Lula made clear that he intends to treat social media regulation as a priority. His government has made 

 towards that end — but it is up against a majority-conservative Congress 

that acts as Big Tech’s shock troops to block

In Brazil, many of the deputies and senators who previously acted in Big Tech’s favor come from right-wing or far-right parties, such as the ultraliberal Novo and the PL, Jair Bolsonaro’s party. Most of the deputies who backed Big Tech during the last legislative term were re-elected with sizable vote totals or won Senate seats — meaning that, in the Brazilian legislature at least, Big Tech 

Pending in the Chamber of Deputies are bills including the AI Legal Framework and the Digital Markets bill aimed at curbing Big Tech monopoly power, and bills to combat online misogyny. Also under discussion are the legislative decrees (PDLs) introduced by lawmakers to suspend the Lula government’s decrees tightening rules for platforms. It is also possible that the new Congress will decide to overturn the 

Supreme Court’s holding that platforms are liable for criminal content

 circulating on them, creating new — and looser — rules in the name of “free expression.”

It will be difficult for regulatory proposals to advance in this scenario, but not impossible: the approval of the 

, Brazil’s child protection law, showed that it is indeed possible to unite Congress around essential causes.

In his new term, Lula will also be able to appoint four more justices to the Supreme Court. The nominations, however, must go through a hearing and a vote in the Senate, where the scenario is unfavorable — the largest caucus belongs to the PL, the far-right party.

But this historic second-round victory created a reorganized popular base of support for Lula, and gave the incoming government new room to negotiate with lawmakers. On October 14, for example, the Senate approved the constitutional amendment 

 — six days of work for one of rest, a schedule worked by some 14.9 million Brazilians — and Congress promulgated it two days later, replacing it with a five-day week and two paid days off, effective in 60 days. The Chamber had passed the measure back in May, but Senate President Davi Alcolumbre delayed the vote until after the first round of the presidential election. When it finally reached the floor, amid an intense campaign online and in the streets, opposition evaporated: Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, who had opposed the measure, voted in favor.

The lessons of these victories give new energy to the Brazilian left — which now appears to have grasped the urgency of regulating and restraining the power of large transnational corporations capable of influencing an election.

 has tentatively returned to the negotiating table, but its revival remains partial. In February, the Financial Times 

 that talks on the UK-US Tech Prosperity deal had restarted, though efforts to reach an agreement over the UK’s Digital Services Tax and online safety rules remain stalled. The US has also renewed its push to remove digital taxes by 

 100% tariffs on countries introducing them.

 originally based on an informal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing collaboration between the two nations on nuclear energy and quantum technologies, joint AI research initiatives, promoting exports of data centers and AI models, aligning policy and co-development of standards in AI. Alongside the deal, tech companies like Microsoft, Nvidia, OpenAI, Google and CoreWeave had announced a combined 

 of investment, mostly through building AI infrastructure.

 deal, intended to bind the AI ambitions of the two nations, almost 

 fell through due to continued trade disagreements, particularly rules restricting American agricultural products, online safety regulations and digital taxes. One year on, and investment pledges linked to the deal have 

 the very infrastructure buildout the deal hinges on.

The future of the UK-US Tech Prosperity Deal remains uncertain as renewed negotiations raise questions over whether the UK government will trade away digital regulatory powers in pursuit of closer ties with Washington, even as questions remain over 

Renewed talks raise questions over digital regulation and autonomy

Under the Starmer Labour government, the party had made it its mission to “

” AI into the veins of the nation, encouraging vast infrastructural buildout of data centers through “

 and investments from private firms. His government was accused of 

 Big Tech perspectives when consulting on policy initiatives. Their vision was that AI was to boost economic growth, and largely pinned their hope on US investment dollars to achieve this.

The new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, had 

 before taking office that his government would depart from the Starmer government on technology strategy, suggesting he would support stronger regulatory enforcement and abandon the “tech boosterism” that marked his predecessor’s reign. In practice, though, he has arguably taken a more “

Signs suggest the Burnham government may be willing to make concessions to appease Trump and avoid further tariffs. In August, 

 said the Burnham government is willing to “discuss” the UK’s 

 that, rather than scrapping the tax entirely, it would be replaced by “a global solution” once it is in place. Civil society organizations have 

 at the possibility that the tax may be traded for a trade deal and have urged the government not to cave to pressure.

The Digital Services Tax is a 2% tax on revenues derived from UK users' use of services such as search engines, social media, and online marketplaces, though it applies only to firms with revenues exceeding £500 million globally and £25 million from UK users. Several European countries have 

When the Digital Services Tax was first announced in 2020, the US administration under President Trump’s first term threatened tariff retaliation, 

 that it unfairly discriminated against US firms like Google and Amazon. The tax had been 

 due to “a misalignment between the place where profits are taxed and the place where value is created,” and was intended to “ensure the large multinational businesses in-scope make a fair contribution to supporting vital public services.” The UK 

 cut the tax under the Starmer government in exchange for reduced tariffs, though ultimately it has stayed in place.

The second Trump administration has continued to double down on fighting digital taxes across the globe, releasing a 

 warning countries that taxes and regulations deemed to “discriminate” against US firms would be investigated and penalized through tariffs.

 to the US are online safety rules. The UK’s 

 enforced by Ofcom, the UK’s media and communications regulator, aimed at tackling illegal content on online platforms and protecting children from accessing harmful content. The Act takes a tiered approach, with the largest or most risky firms obligated to adhere to the strictest rules.

 over the potential for the Online Safety Act to “censor” citizens, and also that it “

” affects large American firms. The EU, which has similarly come 

 for its own tech regulations, has defended its 

 right to enforce its own laws, though there are signs that the EU may have 

 regulatory enforcement to avoid prompting unwelcome attention from the US President. Under Starmer, the Online Safety Act and digital competition rules 

 discussion as part of trade talks with the US, but faced significant 

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has been 

 for its closeness to the tech industry. Following the 

, including their willingness to back him on policy changes, the administration in turn has been ready to protect its interests both at home and abroad. Coupled with the fact that the second Trump administration has leaned on tech companies to coerce 

 that they may not be able to trust the US, highlighting the need for greater technological sovereignty.

 on the matter, the UK has a murkier definition of what sovereignty means. The Starmer government was continually accused of maintaining a cozy relationship with US tech giants, with a rotating door of 

 by the industry in shaping government policy. Indeed, the UK-US Tech Prosperity Deal itself appeared generally one-sided. Under that deal, the tech giants accrued much of the benefit, allowing them to build 

 that simply channels profits back to US headquarters.”

 on US tech giants, Burnham’s government must consider the inherent imbalance of power between themselves and a US administration backed by Big Tech.

How a digital trade deal could constrain UK regulation

 to negotiate trade deals that favor Big Tech firms are explored in a report from 

, a coalition of civil society organizations calling for trade “justice” which “tackles poverty and protects the environment.” Their 

examines how digital trade rules promoted by the US could restrict the UK government's ability to introduce mandatory AI rules, constrain Ofcom's enforcement powers under the Online Safety Act, weaken enforcement of the 

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act

, and weaken protections for personal data.

The report analyzes trade agreements signed between the US and other countries to understand what terms the US is demanding in exchange for lower tariffs following the Trump administration’s imposition of 

. The report points to “non-discrimination” for digital products and services, a policy that is intended to promote liberal free trade, which can be used to shield tech giants from regulation.

The authors point out that because digital markets are largely dominated by a handful of US firms, “almost any regulation aimed at market power, scale, or systemic risk will, in practice, fall most heavily on those firms.” Where legislation uses quantitative criteria like revenue thresholds or end user numbers to tier obligations so that smaller firms avoid over-regulation while large firms must have the highest regulatory burden, the largest firms are all likely to be based in the US, which may be characterized as de facto discrimination. The authors argue that “it is unclear whether the UK could resist US demands to include such a clause in a potential UK-US digital trade agreement,” illustrating that other agreements on reciprocal trade have included them.

Such an agreement, the authors argue, would immediately jeopardize regulations such as the Online Safety Act and the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, which both either directly target the largest firms, as is the case with the latter, or place the most obligations on the biggest firms, such as the tiered Online Safety Act. Both would be subject to non-discrimination rules were such an agreement signed. In addition, a Digital Services Tax would also likely be captured by non-discrimination rules, by virtue of the largest firms being US-based.

In general, the report warns that a digital trade agreement risks not only “a poor bargain on the substance,” but also “that the substance would not be settled by the bargain at all.” The US holds all the power in tech negotiations. The biggest firms are based in the US, and the US is the UK’s 

 export market. Meanwhile, the UK continues to tie itself to the US in tech, maintaining close ties with those firms, and 

US tech giants' rhetoric continues to shape UK public policy, 

 unpopular hyperscale data centers to be built, despite the fact that they are unlikely to benefit the local population. The UK already struggles to regulate the same giants it depends on for critical infrastructure, illustrating the need for the Burnham government to prioritize greater technological sovereignty. A renewed tech deal may trade away the government’s only tools to tame the tech giants.

Early in Alex Gibney’s new documentary, “

,” the Silicon Valley mogul is introduced to a MAGA rally as “the greatest capitalist in history.”

However one regards Elon Musk — electric vehicle and space pioneer, 

 chaos agent, fascist enabler, megalomaniac, all of the above — this movie makes a convincing case that he is 

 a “great capitalist,” let alone the greatest ever. On the business front, he has combined an uncanny ability to hoover up government subsidies and contracts with a P.T. Barnum-level talent for hucksterism. From this mixture, he built an historic fortune based on the value of the stock of one company, Tesla. A master of the free market or an exemplar of rugged individualism, Musk is not.

He is powerful, though, as the Gibney documentary also demonstrates. Musk has used a small fraction of his now 

 to become the single most influential political financier of his generation — more specifically, the single most important underwriter of Donald Trump and the MAGA movement. This financing, in turn, bought him unique, if brief, access to direct political power early in the second Trump administration — the DOGE episode — which Musk used to cripple or destroy several federal agencies, including those with the authority to investigate and regulate his companies Tesla and SpaceX. When it comes to artificial intelligence, the hottest button in tech policy at the moment, Musk’s ambitions are inscrutable, but there is no reason to assume they are benign. Just one illustration: his Grok chatbot’s 

Simultaneously, he has exploited the deterioration of the US government-led space program to transform SpaceX into the world’s dominant satellite-launching operation. This has made him the private citizen with the most influence over American foreign policy, now and probably

 with Ukraine’s drone defenses in its war against Russia, a conflict that could determine the balance of power throughout Europe. Responding to the prospect of Democrats retaking control of Congress in the November 3 midterms and launching investigations of his role in Ukraine, among other matters, Musk in late October 

 to “come for” those “who pick fights with me.”

So, Gibney’s “Musk” is timely; its subject, consequential. In the 2025-26 midterm election cycle, he is once again MAGA’s lead financier, 

 an astounding $442 million for Republican candidates 

. In the dark money era, such estimates are suspect and likely on the low side. It matters urgently what the man says, does, and thinks.

Musk, for what it’s worth, did not enjoy “Musk.” On his social media platform, X, he 

: “Gibney just assembled a hit list of people who either have an axe to grind or don’t even know me (but still have an axe to grind). He has ZERO integrity. Horrible human.”

Here, I’m going to offer a micro-review of “Musk,” followed by a brief discussion of some of the personal issues the movie raises, and then an analysis of several of the more important aspects of Musk’s role in business and politics.

Bloated, “traumatizing,” but also instructive

,” a 2007 documentary about US interrogation and torture practices in Afghanistan, and has directed many other excellent nonfiction films. With “Musk,” sadly, he got carried away. It’s nearly four hours long and feels longer. Bloated and repetitive, it lacks a fresh interview of Musk, who refused to cooperate, and instead relies on numerous “comments” from a creepy AI-generated version of Musk. On top of that, Gibney has interwoven actual archival footage and contemporary interviews with jangly video game imagery meant to suggest Musk’s manic behavior and thinking. The movie “is traumatizing because he is a traumatizing figure,” Gibney has 

. “In certain narrative, thematic, and formal ways, I’m trying to put ourselves inside his head.” Fair enough,

but a lot less of these theatrics would still have gone a long way.

Despite these flaws, Gibney’s film contributes to our understanding of its subject. “Musk” offers an instructive portrait of a deeply unsettling figure with the ability to impose his warped ideas on US society and the world at large. The juxtaposition of his shady business practices, increasingly fascistic political agenda, and personal weirdness underscores just how dangerous he has become. Gibney provides a service merely by compiling decades’ worth of Musk snickering through podcasts, hopping around on various political stages, and, in one instance, shooting 

Among the filmmaker’s most intriguing interviewees are mothers of some of Musk’s children, women who testify to his capacity for personal cruelty, narcissism, and dishonesty. These aren’t necessarily the traits that have the broadest public policy implications, but they do shed light on Musk’s psychology and character.

Justine Wilson, who was married to him from 2000 to 2008, eloquently describes his nonstop histrionic manner and the devastating way he declared one of their six children “dead” — “

” — after she transitioned to being a woman. To Wilson, it’s a doubly painful description; another of their children literally died in infancy. Musk has claimed he was holding the baby and “felt his last heartbeat.” Wilson 

 was holding the child when he died. Throughout his life and career, the documentary shows, Musk has taken credit he hasn’t deserved.

, a former right-wing influencer and mother of another child with Musk, speaks about his unusual proclivity for procreation — there are 14 publicly known Musk offspring — which apparently is 

 to his anxiety about existential threats to the future of humankind. St. Clair says that he once told her that they should have a “legion of children before the civil war.”

Another piece of the psychological puzzle comes from Musk’s father, Errol, who tells Gibney about how his son was bullied and beaten up as a boy in their racially polarized homeland of South Africa. Errol also blandly recounts how he once shot and killed three Black intruders, watching them slowly bleed to death. How all of this fits together, Gibney doesn’t explain, perhaps wisely, as a unified diagnosis may be impossible.

After an intermission, the second half of the documentary shifts to Musk’s career and political role. In this realm, Gibney illustrates that Musk’s talent lies in identifying ways to profit from government infrastructure and anticipating public policy shifts, ranging from the privatization of national security in the wake of 9/11 to subsidies for “green” industry during the same time frame. In their 2026 book, 

 recently for Tech Policy Press, authors Quinn Slobodian and Ben Tarnoff note that “Musk has always had an instinct for putting his entrepreneurial energies into sectors that could benefit from the munificence of Uncle Sam.”

Late-1990s directory and financial-services businesses Musk started and sold relied heavily on publicly funded internet infrastructure available to dot-com founders at no cost. His first two companies never made a profit, but he cashed out for a total of more than $200 million based on frothy expectations of future growth. With that initial haul, he started SpaceX and invested in Tesla, which he later took over, claiming disingenuously to be the EV company’s “founder.”

While Gibney questions whether his subject is really the “engineer” he claims to be — as opposed to a marketer and big-picture guy, roughly on the model of Steve Jobs at Apple — the filmmaker acknowledges that Musk helped spur the electric vehicle market and accomplished space breakthroughs like deployment of reusable rockets. As a cash-strapped NASA atrophied, SpaceX effectively became the American space program, by 2025, accounting for 

 in the US and more than half of all launches globally.

Musk did this with taxpayer dollars. Both SpaceX and Tesla 

 in the 2000s and survived only as a result of an array of government grants, credits, and other assistance. The federal government awarded SpaceX more than $500 million in grants in its early years. When the company was still almost out of cash in 2008, it received a then-unprecedented $1.6 billion contract from NASA.

For its part, Tesla had sold fewer than 2,000 cars by January 2010. Then it 

 a whopping $465 million low-interest loan from the Department of Energy, which was crucial to the development of its first major success, the Model S sedan. Tesla survived to launch an IPO and paid back the loan with proceeds from an additional sale of stock. In another example of government largesse, a $7,500 tax credit for EV buyers allowed Tesla and other car makers to sell US-made electric vehicles at higher prices than otherwise would have been feasible; these credits totaled some $3.4 billion by the time the perk ended in 2019. Yet another program allowed Tesla to sell “emission credits” to non-EV car makers that accounted for nearly 25% of Tesla’s revenue in 2008. It wasn’t until 2021 that Tesla was able to 

 without the boost from green credit sales.

Propping up the nascent EV industry and privatizing US space endeavors may or may not have been wise public policy choices. But without these government initiatives, Gibney convincingly

argues, Elon Musk likely wouldn’t be anywhere close to as rich as he became.

The extent of that wealth depends on Tesla’s stock price, and Gibney alleges that Musk has goosed the value of his shares by misleading the public about the cars’ 

 of self-driving features. Like the government subsidies, none of these constitute revelations original to “Musk,” but the movie consolidates them in a way that demythologizes the supposedly “greatest capitalist in history.”

What may be fresh insight for some viewers is Gibney’s point that Musk’s depredations under the banner of DOGE did far more than destroy the US Agency for International Development and, by some estimates, 

 the health and lives of hundreds of thousands of aid recipients around the world. By haphazardly slashing budgets and firing or otherwise causing the departure of 

 a range of other agencies charged with regulating Musk’s business activities. These include the National Highway Safety Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, National Labor Relations Board, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Viewed from this perspective, Musk’s spending so much on the midterms to try to keep Congress under Republican control appears to be a campaign to preserve the misdeeds of DOGE.

The scariest of Musk’s exertions of influence is seen in his attempt to tilt the war over Ukraine in Russia’s favor. “Musk” explains how he became the dominant global satellite launcher, and recent 

 and others has revealed that Musk “ordered the slowdown of a military-grade version of Starlink [one of his satellite-based networks] relied on by Ukraine, a decision that sparked panic in Kyiv and confusion inside the Trump administration.”

Leaving aside the ambiguities still surrounding the precise balance of power between the US president and his chief financier, Trump and Musk have both sided with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin and criticized Ukraine for attacking Russian oil refining capacity.

Gibney doesn’t clarify what drives Musk’s foreign policy stance beyond his affinity for illiberal forces ranging from Putin’s autocracy to 

right-wing political movements in Germany

, and elsewhere. On this question, it helps to recall Musk’s roots in apartheid South Africa, which may help explain his animosity toward practically everyone outside of his Caucasian, European-descended, technology-gated ecosystem. “If tolerance means the end of Western Civilization,” he posted to his 225 million X followers in August 2025, “then we cannot be tolerant.”

 offer what might be the best theory on how to understand the mogul’s overall agenda. He thinks he can cajole or pressure everyone to do business with him and boost his power and bottom line. The pitch, they write, is that “in an increasingly unstable world, both states and individuals can fortify their self-reliance by plugging into [Musk’s] infrastructures.”

That’s not a brave new world where I, for one, want to live.

There is a current shortage of AI data centers, but that shortage is temporary. More AI data centers will be built than will be needed to satisfy future AI compute demand. The industry is in the throes of a familiar bubble, where more investment flows into constructing facilities for a new technology than can be supported by customer demand. This has happened before with railroads and internet communications facilities and is happening again now with AI data centers.

An oversupply is usually followed by a contraction — prices and supply collapse until an equilibrium is restored. But in this case the overexpansion of AI data centers is so large that the contraction is likely to have substantial macroeconomic consequences, a rapid decline in stock values and economic activity across the economy. This sequence of a recession following an overexpansion is also a familiar pattern established by the earlier overexpansion of railroads and internet facilities.

Regulation can serve several purposes other than preventing the coming AI data center crash. Policymakers generally know how to protect electricity ratepayers from paying the costs of providing service to AI data centers and picking up the bill for stranded transmission and distribution facilities no longer needed to supply AI data centers. Policymakers are moving toward AI safety regulation needed to protect against dangerous AI experiments by AI developers. Congress should begin a series of hearings on the liability of AI developers and deployers for damages caused by AI models and agents, and a system of insurance needed to make sure victims of these mishaps can be compensated. Policymakers must also begin to address inaccuracies and unreliability of AI models, especially in consequential areas such as providing health information to the public. Along with collaborators, I will be addressing these issues in upcoming commentaries.

Unfortunately, the system of governance in the US does not provide policy tools to prevent the coming oversupply-contraction cycle in AI data centers. Generally speaking investors are free to put their money where they feel they can earn the largest return, even if the collective result is an economic crash. Policymakers should be aware, however, of the industry dynamics that are leading to this outcome, even if there is little they can do to stop it.

Chips are the key physical elements in an AI data center. Strung together in elaborate layouts of ever-increasing density within enormous physical structures, they are the devices that AI companies use to train and operate their AI models. There are shortages of chips, especially memory chips, and prices for these scarce items are soaring. But the major cloud computing companies, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have been 

 a steady supply of chips from providers like Nvidia and have begun to 

In addition to chips, data centers costs include land, design and engineering expenses, construction of physical structures, power, cooling facilities, and networking expenses. Together with Meta, the three major cloud companies are expected to 

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