EU’s Democracy Shield Prioritizes Coordination with Tech Firms Over Enforcement
Ramsha Jahangir / Nov 12, 2025
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gives remarks in March 2025. Source
With much fanfare but limited firepower, the European Commission today launched its long-trailed ‘Democracy Shield,’ a flagship initiative designed to safeguard the EU’s democratic processes from foreign interference, disinformation, and hybrid threats.
Billed as a pillar of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s campaign for a second term, the Democracy Shield centers more on coordination and voluntary measures than on the enforcement of Europe’s digital rules.
Among its most concrete plans is to prepare a Digital Services Act (DSA) incident and crisis protocol. This protocol is intended to enable EU and national authorities to coordinate more quickly during serious incidents—such as election interference or cross-border disinformation campaigns—by working directly with platforms and relevant agencies.
The protocol will be supported by a European Center for Democratic Resilience, which is tasked with information-sharing, stakeholder engagement, and capacity-building among European member states and civil society groups. The center will be led by EU Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath, who described the broader effort as foundational to the EU’s democratic resilience agenda. “The Democracy Package will serve as our roadmap to confront the evolving challenges our democracies face, and to support all those who uphold them,” he said at a news conference on Wednesday.
EU sticks with voluntary code to rein in Big Tech
The Commission reaffirms the Code of Conduct on Disinformation as the EU’s main vehicle for holding large platforms accountable — despite persistent doubts about its effectiveness. The Code sets out voluntary commitments for VLOPs and VLOSEs to counter disinformation, including improving user tools, collaborating with fact-checkers, and limiting monetization of false content.
But enforcement remains light-touch. Companies are not legally bound by the Code, and several major signatories have already withdrawn. A European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) study published in July flagged “consistent gaps in transparency, independent oversight and measurable outcomes” by major platforms across all commitments, warning that the Code risks becoming “performative” if platforms fail to deliver concrete results.
Despite claims of election interference in Germany and Romania, the Commission has not concluded any proceedings against VLOPs under the DSA. Rather than tightening enforcement, the Commission is leaning on regulatory dialogues, discussions with platforms under the DSA’s systemic risk framework, to push for progress.
In its Democracy strategy, the Commission committed to working with the Code’s signatories to strengthen their efforts as regards the transparency of recommender systems and to demonetize disinformation, including to remove financial incentives for disinformation via advertising revenues and to develop relevant indicators to measure platforms’ efforts in this regard. The Commission also signaled it may explore further voluntary measures, including AI-generated content labelling and user verification tools, though these remain undefined and non-binding.
A calibrated approach
The Shield situates the EU’s disinformation strategy in a broader geopolitical context. The Shield has been shaped by months of internal debate and external pressure—particularly from the United States, where lawmakers have criticized EU digital rules as a potential overreach. The communication heavily emphasizes respect for freedom of expression and partnerships and avoids any suggestion of content regulation.
The Commission points to global democratic resilience as a parallel priority, reaffirming support for civic education, fact-checking, and independent media outside the EU via the Team Europe Democracy Initiative.
The communication expands the EU’s monitoring and verification infrastructure. A new European Network of Fact-Checkers will be launched to scale fact-checking across all EU official languages. In parallel, EDMO will enhance its independent situational awareness capabilities, focusing on elections and real-time monitoring during crises.
With pressure mounting from both transatlantic allies wary of overreach and internal stakeholders demanding more robust action, the Shield’s effectiveness will depend less on architecture and more on political will to act when those voluntary measures fall short.
Authors
