Old Tricks, New Tech: How Legacy Media Capture Fuels Today’s Digital Authoritarianism

When Viktor Orbán stormed back into power in 2010, one of his first orders of business was to bring the media to heel. The Hungarian prime minister, head of the conservative Fidesz party and self-declared champion of 'illiberal democracy,' had long blamed the press for Fidesz’s defeat in the 2006 elections, which paved the way for the rival Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) to take the reins. So, once back in the driver’s seat, Orbán wasted no time in tightening his grip on the media landscape.

What followed over the next 15 years reads like a textbook case of media capture, as described by numerous scholars and experts—a calculated, unrelenting campaign by Orbán and his allies to seize control of most of Hungary’s media ecosystem.

It began with the purge of public broadcasters—independent journalists were shown the door, replaced by loyalists with Fidesz credentials. Governance boards were stacked with party insiders in a rapid-fire maneuver that placed Hungarian public media squarely under government control. The national media regulator soon followed suit, its leadership swiftly packed with political loyalists. In the years that ensued, state advertising—a lucrative cash flow controlled by the government—was redirected with surgical precision to pro-government outlets. Meanwhile, business moguls close to the regime began buying private media companies steadily.

The late Hungarian-born Hollywood producer Andy Vajna acquired TV2, one of the country’s major television channels. Lőrinc Mészáros, a childhood friend of Orbán’s from their hometown of Felcsút, took over Mediaworks, a powerful publishing house with control over regional dailies and major sports and business papers.

Year after year, Fidesz-aligned oligarchs continued their buying spree, often in the run-up to elections. These media outlets, now part of a sprawling pro-Orbán media empire, quickly toed the party line, recasting their editorial slant to support the government—and, in doing so, helping Orbán secure win after win at the ballot box.

This model of media capture has since become a case study in soft authoritarian control. Its blueprint rests on four pillars: the takeover of public media, the political capture of the media regulator, the deployment of state funds as leverage over editorial content, and the strategic acquisition of private outlets. This formula has been successfully exported—with variations—to other countries. The same playbook has been implemented in countries ranging from Poland and Slovakia in Eastern Europe to Egypt in the MENA region, to Nicaragua in Latin America, and to Cambodia in Southeast Asia.

Efforts to manipulate the media are nothing new; history is littered with regimes that sought to bend the press to their will. What distinguishes this modern form of capture, however, is the role of the private sector. Corporations reliant on government contracts or regulatory leniency buckled under pressure, buying up media outlets and turning them into mouthpieces of state propaganda. In the digital age, media capture is often coupled with digital authoritarianism, where governments and non-state actors collaborate to use technologies to conduct surveillance, restrict access to information, and distort the journalistic ecosystem with authoritarian-friendly outlets and campaigns of disinformation.

The internet as a fragile last refuge

As government-aligned forces have tightened their grip on traditional media in different countries, the internet emerged as the last space where independent journalism could survive. In 2011, as government attacks by the Orban regime on press freedom escalated, a group of Hungarian journalists launched Atlatszo, an investigative nonprofit that operated entirely online. Similarly, in Slovakia, when Sme, a leading daily, was bought in 2014 by a financial group with ties to the government, around 50 journalists walked out and founded Denník N, an independent news portal.

For more than a decade, the internet has been the only haven for embattled journalists in media-captured environments. Social media, in particular, provided an unfiltered channel for stories that state-controlled outlets would never touch. While national regulators and markets could be co-opted or coerced, digital platforms—beyond the immediate reach of domestic authorities—offered a rare and precious window for truth-telling.

But the web wasn’t just a stage for their reporting—it also became a lifeline to keep the lights on. In several countries with media capture, independent outlets funded much of their operations through ad revenues via platforms like Google Ads. Investigative outfits in Turkey, Hungary, and Serbia kept their doors open thanks to the revenue flowing in from these channels. In some cases, tech companies even stepped in with direct support. Denník N, for instance, developed its digital subscription service with a €300,000 grant from Google’s Digital News Initiative.

In many ways, the tech sector—though often haphazardly and without a clear agenda—has thrown journalism a rope when it was on the verge of drowning in some countries. But that narrative is starting to unravel. As tech giants narrow their focus on shoring up their bottom lines, they are drifting closer to governments, authoritarian or otherwise.

Big Tech aligns with state power

The closeness between Big Tech and state power became obvious after Donald Trump secured a second term, with tech CEOs cozying up to his administration. Across the globe, as global tech companies set up shop in new territories, their relationships with local authorities have warmed.

In Turkey, for example, Google has faced criticism for allegedly supporting pro-Erdogan media outlets in a country where nearly 95 percent of the country’s media is under government influence through a combination of forced shutdowns, regulatory pressure, and crony capitalism. Not only has Google been accused of boosting pro-government sources in search results, it has also provided financial support through its grant programs to outlets tied to the pro-Erdogan media, such as the Demirören Media Group.

Following Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter—now rebranded as X—the platform appears to have dropped its guardrails against authoritarian regimes. In 2023, reports surfaced that restrictions on government-linked accounts from Russia, China, and Iran were quietly lifted. Facebook, too, has come under scrutiny. According to The Washington Post, in Vietnam, the social network’s seventh-largest market globally, the company has reportedly complied with government demands to censor dissent and de-platform regime critics.

All these cases point to an unsettling trend: the tech industry’s increasing pliancy toward state power, often to the detriment of independent journalism. At the same time, the number of truly independent public media is shrinking rapidly around the world. Without safeguards to press freedom online, tech platforms risk becoming the fifth column of authoritarian governments, closing off what little space remains for dissenting voices.

Why tech governance must include press freedom

Robust policy interventions are urgently needed to prevent this possibility, particularly in regions where media capture threatens democratic stability. Independent monitoring efforts, such as the Ranking Digital Rights that examines public policy documents and terms of service of the major platforms around the world, reveal that we know very little about what kind of content big tech censors, which users companies block, and whether or not they share our data with needy governments.

Among global actors, the European Union has been the most vocal in challenging Big Tech's unchecked power. The Digital Services Act (DSA) requires large platforms to conduct regular risk assessments and undergo independent audits to counter systemic threats, such as disinformation. However, the platforms’ reports on how they fulfill their commitments under the DSA to address disinformation reveal opaque and inconsistent practices in flagging false content or collaborating with independent actors such as fact-checkers and researchers. Without independent researchers and watchdogs' access to platform data, it is difficult to know the extent of bias and disinformation.

The sister regulation of DSA, the Digital Markets Act (DMA), aims to rein in monopolistic practices and level the playing field in digital markets. Yet neither directly addresses the thorny issue of protecting independent journalism and ensuring equitable access to credible news, a domain traditionally governed by professional media standards. The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), a more targeted initiative, does address issues related to media capture, but stops short of regulating Big Tech’s role within the wider ecosystem.

While these legislative tools compel tech companies to act more responsibly in combating information threats, they fall short of addressing how tech may itself become a conduit for capture. The old playbook of media capture shows how entire media systems can be taken over. Until recently, platforms were considered neutral intermediaries that provided spaces to resist legacy media authoritarianism. Yet the digital landscape, as demonstrated infamously in the US and in Central and Eastern Europe, illustrates how online spaces now spew ‘news-like’ disinformation that supports an illiberal agenda. Moreover, recently, platforms have shown their readiness to comply with the demands of non-democratic governments openly, suggesting a willingness to subvert their proclaimed free speech aspirations to benefit from these captured policy environments. Altogether, this points to new forms of media capture.

Reversing this dangerous trend will require both structural changes and enforceable safeguards. One bold idea would be the creation of alternative, public interest-driven platforms. In the EU, projects such as the Council for the European Public Space, which aims to create a shared digital, multilingual space for trustworthy news across Europe, or Eurostack, which envisions a complete European digital sovereignty, have lofty goals, but would require significant political and public support. More realistically, the next steps in the combat against digital authoritarianism must involve policies that prompt digital platforms to elevate independent media, ensuring they don’t become passive enablers—or worse, active participants—in the global drift toward authoritarianism. For instance, in Lebanon, the non-governmental organizations Maharat and Legal Agenda have pushed for EU-inspired media and digital platform policies.

Whether through regulation, public alternatives, or civic action, defending press freedom online is essential if we are to stop media capture in the digital age.