Syria’s Recovery Depends on Rebuilding Its Digital Infrastructure

As Syria enters a new chapter following the fall of the Assad regime, rebuilding the country is the top priority for its people and leaders. While global attention is centered on physical reconstruction, such as hospitals, power stations, and housing, the equally critical work of rebuilding Syria’s digital backbone has been largely neglected, despite its importance for transparency, security, and democratic governance.

Behind the scenes, in servers, cloud systems, and databases that underpin modern governance and society, a quieter but urgent effort is underway: reclaiming and reconstructing Syria’s digital backbone. Yet policy frameworks have mainly overlooked the foundational need to rebuild a secure, sovereign rights-based, democracy-oriented digital infrastructure. This oversight jeopardizes not only the integrity of Syria’s digital systems but also the country’s prospects for a successful democratic transition.

This battle is no less critical; Syria’s democratic transition cannot succeed without proper digital infrastructure and a robust cybersecurity strategy. Neglecting these during post-conflict recovery risks pushing Syria back toward authoritarian practices marked by surveillance, data exploitation, foreign interference, and digital repression.

Secure digital transition is not a luxury

In post-conflict settings, digital transition is often misunderstood and treated as a luxury, an abstract, and secondary to pressing basic needs such as food, shelter, health, or security. This misconception is deeply concerning. A secure digital transition is essential, not optional; it is crucial for democratic recovery, transparency, public trust, and institutional resilience.

Today, digital infrastructure constitutes the backbone of nearly all sectors, from immigration to public health, to the civil registrar, and other critical services. If these systems are insecure, they are vulnerable to compromise, disruption, and misuse. Cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure are a growing global threat and could result in disrupting critical services, such as power, airports, and other vital services.

Post-Assad Syria now has a unique opportunity to start on a sophisticated footing, as the infrastructure and services are being built from scratch. The Assad digital legacy is deeply corrupted and technologically outdated.

Post-conflict life is devastating, but it also presents great opportunities. Other post-conflict states, when they invested wisely in digital transition, became pioneers in integrating tech in governance and digital transformation. Post-Soviet Estonia in the 1990s built one of the world’s most advanced e-governance systems from scratch.

Although this rare opportunity exists, the window for action is narrow and closing rapidly. Delay increases the risk of resorting to quick-fix solutions, such as adopting insecure platforms (e.g., Sham Cash) or relying on foreign digital ID systems.

According to the Syrian Minister of Communication and Information Technology, Abdul Salam Haykal, digital reconstruction and transformation are central pillars of the national recovery strategy. Regional and international investors are increasingly interested in critical sectors such as digital services and artificial intelligence, making the development and adoption of cybersecurity and data protection frameworks even more urgent.

Digital sovereignty as a foundation for transition and democracy

Digital sovereignty refers to a state's ability to control its own digital space (e.g., data, infrastructure, fiber cables, cell towers, software) and technological governance independently, free from the interference of another state or non-state actors. Although not a new concept, digital sovereignty is essential for any successful democratic transition.

Under Assad, the notion of digital sovereignty was co-opted, not for the public interest, but as a tool of surveillance and repression. The regime deployed crude forms of digital authoritarianism, restricting internet access, sponsoring hacking groups such as the Syrian Electronic Army, relying on outdated and insecure infrastructure, and depending heavily on Russia and Iran for surveillance capabilities.

The Assad regime consistently neglected investment in digital infrastructure, privacy, and cybersecurity. Instead, it used the rhetoric of ‘sovereignty’ to justify censorship and the deployment of digital repression rather than empowerment. Assad’s digital legacy was characterized not only by inadequate digital infrastructure but also by digital authoritarianism, digital transnational repression, foreign interference, and the exploitation of citizens’ data. Moreover, regulations such as Syria’s cybercrime law were also co-opted and deployed to serve the regime, not the society.

Humanitarian data, including personally identifiable information (PII) of Syrians, was frequently mishandled, collected, and shared without transparency, legal frameworks, or ethical oversight. Examples include leaked detainee and ‘wanted’ lists circulated online, and the collection of refugees’ biometric data by the UN agencies without informed consent or sufficient transparency. Aid agencies, international organizations, and even host states have often failed to protect Syrian refugees’ PII and adequately respond when data breaches occur.

Restoring digital trust in post-Assad Syria requires a serious reckoning with past abuses and reclaiming digital sovereignty to defend the country, not the rulers. It should prove to Syrians that, like all citizens of the world, they have digital dignity and their digital rights are protected. Digital sovereignty should never come at the expense of citizens’ digital rights and freedoms; building this trust between the transitional government and Syrians is crucial in the pathway towards digital and democratic transformation.

The challenge of fragmented governance and digital insecurity

Beyond Assad’s digital legacy, Syria faces the additional challenges of fragmentation arising from years of conflict and the emergence of four competing de facto governments.

The country was fractured into four major zones of de facto governance, each operating its own digital systems. The four governments, including Assad’s, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in the Northwest, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) in northern Aleppo, and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), each had its own governing systems and digital infrastructure within its governance model. Each had issued IDs, birth certificates, and civil registers.

De Facto governments, local councils, and civil society organizations have been documenting civil status and collecting personally identifiable information (PII). However, this critical work has been conducted without precise protection mechanisms to safeguard such sensitive data. Furthermore, it has been conducted in the absence of a protocol for the future handover of this information.

Unifying Syria’s fragmented digital infrastructure—securely, ethically, and transparently—is an essential measure for national reintegration and long-term stability. Any democratic transition must include a comprehensive strategy to reconcile, protect, and responsibly migrate this data under national protection and oversight.

International tech restrictions and the digital siege

Syria’s digital recovery remains severely constrained by ongoing platform restrictions that block access to essential online services. A recent report by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) highlights how these barriers persist despite the formal lifting of most Western sanctions and despite the Treasury Department issuing General License 25, leaving Syria’s digital space under siege by major tech platforms. Many essential digital services and technologies remain inaccessible from Syrian IP addresses. Companies like Google block Syrians from accessing core services like Firebase and Google Play, forcing users to rely on unofficial applications and exposing them to potentially malicious Android installation files (APKs). Ordinary citizens are prevented from downloading trusted applications from official sources like Google Play and Apple App Store, leaving them vulnerable to malicious third-party applications (e.g., unofficial versions of WhatsApp). When Google recently announced Syria’s removal from its OFAC list and to restore some of its services in Syria, it chose to resume Google Ads rather than essential services like Google Play. Although this is a good step, this sequencing prioritizes commercial services over those more directly related to user safety and access.

These restrictions undermine efforts to reconstruct Syria’s digital infrastructure and build a robust cybersecurity framework. Even widely used open-source software like KoBoToolbox, which is vital for humanitarian data collection and field surveys, relies on platforms like Docker for deployment, which is currently inaccessible in Syria. As a result, Docker-related restrictions are hindering access to essential digital tools needed for humanitarian operations.

The impact of these restrictions goes beyond the government sector. Essential platforms for developers, like GitHub and GitLab, are banning Syrian IP addresses. Even education apps, such as Duolingo and Coursera, remain inaccessible.

Post-Assad Syria had achieved a significant breakthrough by securing the easing of some sanctions, but this alone is insufficient for its full digital recovery and reconstruction. Governments supporting Syria’s transition should actively engage with tech companies to lift digital access restrictions. They can facilitate communication channels and support cooperation mechanisms between the transitional government and platforms; a step could be crucial for Syria’s digital recovery.

Building democratic digital infrastructure: strategy and ethics

The transitional government’s interest in digital transformation is encouraging. However, without the necessary technical and legal frameworks to support this shift, the risks remain significant.

For example, in the absence of clear and rights-based regulations, new systems such as a national digital ID system, while potentially simplifying access to essential services, particularly in rural areas and among marginalized communities, could be misused and turned into a surveillance tool rather than empowering citizens.

The risks are further exacerbated by foreign interference and regional cyber threats. Syria exists within a regional cyber battlefield, with Israel, Turkey, Iran, Gulf states, Russia, and Western states all active in cyber espionage and cyber warfare. If Syria fails to build a robust cyber defense capacity, its digital infrastructure will remain highly vulnerable.

This transformation should prioritize sovereign, locally hosted data centers, network restoration, regulatory reform, and the establishment of an independent national cybersecurity authority. While sovereign local data centers reduce states' reliance on foreign actors and can strengthen national resilience, they can, on the other hand, increase the potential for state control over citizens’ data. Rights-based legal framework and independent oversight, along with transparent protection and accountability, can prevent turning this data into a new surveillance tool. Syria’s national cybersecurity authority, therefore, should be accountable to a future democratic parliament, and during the transitional period, to the transitional oversight mechanisms.

An equally essential component is a robust regulatory framework. The transitional government should cut ties with Assad’s authoritarian legal legacy and revoke all repressive laws that were imposed to repress citizens and silence critical voices. New internet regulations must be rights-based, focused on protecting citizens’ data, limiting surveillance, and safeguarding civic freedoms, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association.

The broader strategy should be embedded in a layered digital infrastructure, starting from physical infrastructure (like fiber cables and data centers), cybersecurity, government-managed systems, and citizen-facing services. It must also encompass a comprehensive cyber defense strategy to protect critical infrastructure from foreign interference, espionage, and other malicious threats, as well as transparency and mechanisms to engage civil society meaningfully.

Sustainability requires these measures to be supported by extensive public sector training and public educational initiatives. Cybersecurity should become part of day-to-day practices and should be backed by awareness-raising campaigns and digital literacy programs across the whole society. Civil society should play a vital role in these efforts, and to facilitate this, the government should remove all obstacles, such as a lack of coordination and transparency, all of which can restrict participation. The government should also create open and effective communication channels with civil society organizations. Digital rights defenders and organizations should play a critical role in monitoring and advocating for a free, secure, and inclusive digital space, and the government should keep the coordination channels open and transparent.

Code for democracy

While digital sovereignty, regulations, and cybersecurity are essential measures for post-conflict recovery, they should never come at the expense of civil liberties. Syrians, over the decades, have been fighting and have paid a heavy price for their rights and freedoms. A democratic digital future must prevent any return to surveillance, censorship, or digital authoritarianism.

A truly democratic and rights-based digital transition must be accountable, transparent, and citizen-centered. Decisions about digital infrastructure, data governance, and cybersecurity should serve the public, not external actors, totalitarian interests, or unaccountable systems.

New Syria doesn’t have to reinvent the wheel; it can benefit from digital rights organizations’ work, which has created principles for rights in the digital age. For example, the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms emphasizes crucial principles including accessibility, freedom of expression, rights to information, privacy, security and resilience of the internet, rights of marginalized groups and groups at risk, democratic multistakeholder internet governance, and gender equality. Syria’s digital transitional work can endorse this declaration and draw on these principles to ensure the digital future of Syria is rights-and democracy-centered.

A successful democratic digital transition is achievable. The transitional government in Syria must first be willing to restore the country’s digital sovereignty, protect rights, and prevent exploitation. A whole-of-government coordination approach is needed to ensure that all institutions are aligned and working together.

Critical regulatory pathways include writing and implementing data protection law aligned with international standards (e.g., GDPR). The internal and domestic work should be supported by cyber diplomacy efforts to engage effectively in international cooperation and open communication channels with tech companies to lift digital restrictions on Syria. Finally, civil society should be empowered and considered a crucial stakeholder in all processes.

For this to happen, Syria needs to invest and be open to connecting and working with Syrian experts in the country and in exile.

Syria’s path forward

The digital transition is not merely a technical matter; it is a political choice that will define what kind of state post-Assad Syria will be: democratic and accountable, or authoritarian; successful or dysfunctional; digitally transformative and globally integrated, or outdated and corrupt. The stakes for Syria’s future are immense, and the actions required are urgent and foundational.

Democratization will never be achieved through national dialogue, a new constitution, or elections alone if the digital space remains vulnerable. The cornerstone of democracy is also a secure, sovereign, and rights-based digital foundation rooted in transparency, accountability, and privacy. Failure means exposing all institutions’ and citizens’ data, leaving the country vulnerable to cyber attacks and foreign interference, missing the opportunity for digital transformation and democratization, and sliding back into digital authoritarianism.

This is not a matter of infrastructure. It is a matter of vision, political will, and gaining the public’s trust. A secure, transparent, and accountable digital space will not only support democracy; it will help shape it.

The risks are high, but the opportunity to rebuild an open, free, democratic, and rights-based digital space for Syria is very unique. Taking it could never be more urgent.